Abstract: Thanks to advancements in smart mobile devices and social media platforms, sharing photos and experiences has significantly bridged the authors' lives, allowing them to stay connected despite distance and other barriers. Most approaches to protect image visual privacy focus on encrypting or permuting image data, which generate unreadable image or highly distorted visual effect and therefore may not be in users best interest from both usage and perception perspectives. In this study, the authors propose secure JPEG transmorphing, a framework for protecting image visual privacy in a secure, reversible, and highly flexible and personalised manner. Secure JPEG transmorphing allows one to apply arbitrary regional visual manipulation on image regions of interests (ROIs), while secretly preserving the information about the original ROIs in application segments (APPn markers) of the visually obfuscated JPEG image. Objective and subjective experiments have been performed and results indicate that the proposed protection scheme provides near lossless image reconstruction, controllable level of file size expansion, good degree of privacy protection and especially better subjective pleasantness.
Introduction
The number of images shared from mobile devices has reached scales which were unimaginable only a decade ago: Every day over two billion images are posted to Online Social Networks (OSNs) or exchanged through instant messaging and cloud-based sharing services. However, advancements of photo sharing have also raised concerns for privacy, as photos potentially reveal great amount of sensitive information about people. OSN sites usually offer a limited degree of privacy protection and the most common solution is just conditional access. Researchers in the field of image processing and media security have proposed various approaches to enable photo privacy, most of which focus on encrypting or permuting the entire image data. From data security point of view, an encryption-based scheme can protect privacy in a highly secure and reversible manner. However, simply encrypting an entire image may significantly affect the usability of photo sharing and may not be in users interest from both usage and perception perspectives. In many cases, people seek simple and intuitive solutions to share their photos online to public while partially protecting specific regions in an image, e.g. creating an anonymous face with a cartoon smiley, blurring or inpainting sensitive areas. Yet, all those interesting manipulations cannot be reversed directly. Inspired by these facts, we attempt to explore novel solutions to protect image visual privacy in not only secure and reversible but also intuitive and pleasant ways.
In this paper, we present secure JPEG transmorphing, a novel framework for JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group) compression. Within secure JPEG transmorphing, most types of regional visual obfuscations can be applied, such as masking, blurring, pixelation, inpainting and warping. More importantly, the original image can be reconstructed with near lossless quality, even if the protected image has been manipulated. Objective experiments were conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed method with respect to its reconstruction quality and storage overhead. Moreover, we also investigate the privacy protection capability and users pleasantness of different regional image obfuscations via a set of subjective experiments via online crowdsourcing.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related works. Section 3 describes in detail the working principle of the proposed protection framework. Then Sections 4 and 5 report the objective and subjective experiments, respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Related work
Early-stage privacy protection mainly aims at enabling the visual privacy in video surveillance. The methods include image pixelation, masking, blurring [1, 2] , scrambling [3] , warping [4] , and morphing [5] . With the rapid development of online social networks and photo sharing services, protecting privacy especially for online photos has raised great challenges. A number of research efforts focused on the design of access control mechanisms such that photos or data shared online can be only accessed by a selected group of people [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . However, most existing access control systems are far from adequate, which could lead to severe information leakage when the OSN cannot apply the access control polices correctly, or if users fail to understand the complex privacy settings.
Another category of schemes to protect privacy in online images aim at encrypting or permuting the image data, before uploading and sharing them on OSN. The encryption or permutation can be performed in different domains, e.g. image pixels, bitstream, or discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients. Poller et al. [11] propose a robust image obfuscation, by permuting pixel blocks and modulating channel intensity. However, its security against different types of attacks is not clearly known and the permuted images could still reveal a certain degree of visual information. Ra et al. [12] propose P3, a photo privacy protection algorithm based on JPEG coding, which splits an image into a public part and a private part, with the public portion shared via OSN and private portion secretly stored in a storage server. However, P3 could disclose rich visual information in its public image when the threshold value is not small enough and its introduction of an additional cloud server complicates the file management system. Tierney et al. [13] propose a system named Cryptagram, which enables users to encrypt photos with traditional block ciphers and embed the encrypted bitstream into a JPEG file. However, this method creates a significant storage overhead due to the use of a cover image. Sun et al. [14] propose a privacy-aware regions of interest (ROI) image encryption scheme named Privacyaware ROI Image Encryption based on logistical mapping and data hiding. The PRIE scheme utilises salient object detection to detect privacy-sensitive regions of an image. After encrypting pixels in the private ROI using chaotic cryptography, the significant bits are embedded into the non-privacy region using data hiding. In addition, various approaches have been proposed to secure JPEG image based on DCT-domain encryption or scrambling. Yuan et al. [15, 16] propose a scrambling scheme that randomly changes the signs of DCT coefficients to enable image visual privacy. Recently, He et al. [17] proposed PUPPIES, a design and implementation of a partial image sharing technique, based on DCT-domain perturbation, which allows users to stipulate specific private image regions and correspondingly set different policies for each user. Other studies include [18, 19] , both encrypting DCT coefficients with different schemes. Many of the solutions mentioned above support the protection of regional image information but some not, e.g. P3. However, all those solutions for protecting image visual privacy stay in the stage of encrypting or permuting image data, in either entire image or ROIs, which results in highly distorted visual effect with poor image quality. It may not be in users' best interest to see and use such methods to protect their own privacy, in particularly in the scenario of online social media. Yet, the impact of visual obfuscations on users' perception and usage preference has not been well studied nor understood.
Secure JPEG transmorphing: the framework
The working principle of secure JPEG transmorphing is to utilise JPEG application segments (APPn marker) to secretly preserve regional original image information, while encoding or transcoding the original image in a visually obfuscated form. The visual information can be protected by any type of regional image manipulation, e.g. masking, blurring, pixelation, inpainting and warping. The protected image, or called transmorphed image, of the same structure as standard JPEG, is backwards compatible with JPEG. With a dedicated JPEG transcoder or decoder that supports JPEG transmorphing, the original image can be recovered by replacing the obfuscated regions in the protected image with the corresponding original regions hidden in JPEG APPn markers.
Transmorphing protection
The protection procedure of secure JPEG transmorphing consists of three steps: (i) mask matrix generation, (ii) sub-image construction and (iii) transmorphing data insertion. Fig. 1 illustrates an example protection procedure for reader's easier understanding.
Mask matrix generation:
Firstly, user obfuscates certain ROIs of a given image using arbitrary regional manipulation, such as masking face regions with cartoon stickers as example images in Fig. 1 . Upon the obfuscation applied, a binary-valued twodimensional matrix is generated, which specifies the shape, size and position of protected ROIs. Each element of the matrix corresponds to a Minimum Coded Unit block of the upcoming encoded JPEG image, where elements 1 indicate protected blocks and 0 unprotected. This matrix is called Mask Matrix, noted as M, which holds essential geometrical information about the image ROIs being protected. Depending on applications, the mask matrix can be generated either from geometrical information of user actions (e.g. coordinates of finger touch on mobile phone), or by comparing the original and obfuscated images. This step is presented in Algorithm 1 ( see Fig. 2 ).
Sub-image construction:
Secondly, a sub-image I Sub is constructed by encoding or transcoding the original image to a new JPEG image, during which DCT coefficients corresponding to the ROIs defined by M are preserved while other coefficients outside the ROIs are set to zero. The sub-image is still a JPEG image with the same dimensions but smaller file size as the original image. It contains information about the original image ROIs to be protected. This procedure is presented in Algorithm 2 (see Fig. 3 ).
Transmorphing data insertion:
Lastly, I Sub is secured by a symmetric encryption scheme with a secret key, e.g. the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [20] or JPEG scrambling [15] . The bytestream of the encrypted sub-image C Sub , the mask matrix M, along with certain metadata, collectively called Transmorphing data, is then inserted into a set of application segments of the obfuscated JPEG image; in this respect, the obfuscated image serves as a 'cover image'. Here we encode the binary-valued mask matrix into a bitstream, with each bit representing an element of M. The metadata contains the auxiliary information about the inserted sub-image and mask matrix, such as the data length and the encryption scheme and parameters applied. Since JPEG allows a maximum of 65, 533 bytes [Each APP marker signals its marker length with two bytes (16 bits), resulting in (2 16 − 1) − 2 = 65, 533 bytes to record extra information.] allocated for each marker segment, the sub-image data very likely needs to be separately stored in several APPn segments. In our current implement, APP11 markers are used for signalling transmorphing data. This step is described in Algorithm 3 (see Fig. 4 ) and the syntax of a transmorphed image file is shown in Fig. 5 . Overhead control (optional): Inserting additional information in protected image increases image file size and we therefore propose a simple mechanism to adjust such overhead by reducing the file size of the final transmorphed image based on DCT coefficients requantisation. To be more specific, we dequantise the DCT coefficients of the obfuscated ROIs in I P and then requantise them with a new quality factor (noted as QF). The requantised DCT coefficients along with other original coefficients of unprotected ROIs are finally entropy-coded. DCT requantisation usually decreases image quality and reduces image file size, which has been identified and well explained in [21] . We just make use of such a 'side effect' of DCT requantisation to decrease the quality and data volume of the obfuscated regions presented in the 'cover image' I P , further reducing the file size of transmorphed image.
Transmorphing reconstruction
The reconstruction procedure aims at recovering the original image from a transmorphed image, by reversing the above transmorphing protection operations: extracting C Sub and M from inserted transmorphing data, decrypting C Sub to get I Sub and replacing the obfuscated ROIs in I P with corresponding information in I Sub . Since the inserted mask matrix and sub-image preserves the complete information about the original image corresponding to the protected ROIs, the protected image is robust to most image transformations. However, we assume that applied transformations do not remove the inserted data in JPEG header, and that the transformation is a known operation that can be re-applied. The replacement process can be done in either frequency (DCT coefficient) or spatial (pixel) domain depending on the transformation applied to the transmorphed image. The Algorithm 4 (see Fig. 6 ) presents the reconstruction procedure of secure JPEG transmorphing.
Objective performance evaluation
Image reconstructed from a reversible protection scheme is expected to be identical or highly similar to the original image. File size expansion due to inserted transmorphing data causes extra storage overhead, which should be as low as possible in practice. In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed secure JPEG transmorphing, in regard to the quality of reconstructed image and the storage overhead introduced. The evaluation was carried out in comparison with another JPEG-based algorithm, P3 [12] .
Image dataset
The People In Photo Albums (PIPA) dataset [22] is used in our experiments. This is a dataset containing over 60,000 JPEG images of more than 2000 individuals collected from public Flickr photo albums. Each image of the dataset has ground truth head positions (rectangle) of several individuals annotated. We randomly selected a subset of 1500 images with the same size of 1204 × 768 pixels from the dataset and use this subset in our experiments [The subset used in this study is available at http://grebvm2.epfl.ch/lin/thesis/ dataset/PIPA-subset-1500.zip]. In addition to the ground truth Head region, we consider two more ROIs as protection target: (i) the Full-body region, 3 × head width and 6 × head height, with head at the top centre of the full body and (ii) the Upper-body region, upper-half of the full body rectangle. 
Reconstruction quality
We applied secure JPEG transmorphing on an individual's three ROIs, respectively, in each image, and P3 on the entire image with a threshold of 5 (note that standard P3 only supports entire image protection). For secure JPEG transmorphing, we applied visual masking with a smiley sticker. Since spatial-domain masking operation involves JPEG decoding and re-encoding, which affects the quality of reconstructed images, we encoded the Transmorphed images with the maximal JPEG quality factor of 100 to minimise such impact. We applied four different transformations on each protected image and then executed the reconstruction process for each protected image without or with transformation applied. The four transformations are For P3, image transformations were applied on both public and secret portions. We use peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and structural similarity index (SSIM) [23] to examine the quality of reconstructed image as compared to the original image. For scaled or cropped image, the two metrics were computed by comparing the reconstructed image with the original image manipulated by the same scaling or cropping operation.
The results of PSNR and SSIM for different reconstruction setups are shown in Table 1 . For comparison, we also include the PSNR and SSIM of original images recompressed in JPEG with a quality factor of 75 as baseline. From the results, one observes the average PSNR and SSIM of reconstructed images from secure JPEG transmorphing are 45.08 dB and 0.987, which would be considered practically lossless in the signal processing community. With different transformations applied on the transmorphed images, reconstructed images still preserve significantly high quality, with PSNR and SSIM scores higher than that of the original images compressed in JPEG (QF = 75). As the rotation operation by JPEG transcoding is lossless, the quality measurements of corresponding reconstructed images are identical to that of images reconstructed without transformation applied. For P3, image reconstructed without transformation is lossless. With scaling and compression applied, the reconstruction quality is slightly worse than our method. This is because lossy image transformations may severely affect the DCT coefficients of P3 public and secret images, which decreases the precision of P3 reconstruction.
Storage overhead
To evaluate the storage overhead, we manually created ten mask matrices representing different ROIs of increasing area (from 10 to 100% of the entire image area) and applied secure JPEG transmorphing on each image with respect to each ROI, without and with DCT requantisation applied (QF = 90, 80, 70, 50 or 30). As JPEG decoding and re-encoding may affect image file size, we directly inserted the sub-image into the original JPEG image instead of creating the actual obfuscated image to diminish such impact. This is equivalent as if we assume the applied image obfuscation does not change the image file size. We also applied P3 [12] protection on each image, using four different threshold values (1, 5, 10 and 20) . The definitions of storage overhead for secure JPEG transmorphing and P3 are given by the following equations, respectively:
where I O denotes the original image, I T is the transmorphed image, I P3 Pub /I P3 Sec the public/secret part of P3 protected image and S( ⋅ ) the operator to get image file size. The storage overhead was computed for each protected image and results over all images (mean and 95% confidence interval) are presented in Fig. 7 . From the result, a near linear relation between storage overhead and area of protected ROI is observed for different setups of secure JPEG transmorphing. Without DCT requantisation applied (TM.Original), the overhead of JPEG transmorphing is considerably higher, which is due to the subimage data inserted. With DCT requantisation applied (TM.QF=n), such overhead is significantly reduced, e.g. by over 40% with TM.QF = 80 compared to the case without overhead control. The overhead of P3 is in general lower than that of JPEG transmorphing when applied on the entire image region. Yet, the major purpose of using JPEG transmorphing is to protect regional image information, instead of obfuscating the entire image. For instance, by applying secure JPEG transmorphing on 40% of the entire image using QF of 80 or 70 in DCT requantisation, the overhead is only between 20 and 30%, which is acceptable in practise considering that JPEG image compressed with QF of 70 or 80 usually maintains fairly high quality.
Subjective evaluation of regional image obfuscation
A previous study [24] reveals that obfuscating just face region may not offer adequate protection to privacy against automatic person recognition carried out by deep neural networks employing visual cues from context information disclosed by other image regions unprotected. This challenges our method which is designed mainly for regional visual privacy protection. However, the degree to which different types of regional visual obfuscations can preserve users' privacy against real human 'attacking', namely recognition by humans, has not yet been well studied. Moreover, most visual obfuscations create unreadable or highly distorted image regions, the impact of which on users' pleasantness has not been identified. Therefore, we conducted a set of subjective experiments via crowdsourcing to investigate (i) the privacy protection capability and (ii) the pleasantness of regional image obfuscations.
Privacy protection capability

Methodology:
We devised a novel subjective experiment where 'attackers' were put in a simplistic social networking scenario to evaluate the performance of different regional image obfuscations against person recognition from real human. The experiment was carried out by employing online subjects to act as attackers to recognise protected persons in images obfuscated by different visual protection methods in different setups. The lower the recognition rate is, the stronger the method is supposed to protect privacy. Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) [https:// www.mturk.com/] was used as the crowdsourcing platform. We selected six identities (adult male) from the PIPA dataset [22] as protection and recognition targets each having four images served as the evaluation set. We then applied seven obfuscations on three ROIs (defined in Section 4.1) of each target identity in each evaluation image, respectively. The seven obfuscations are described in Table 2 . To increase the recognition difficulty, we selected another three identities in addition to the six identities such that subjects were required to identify protected target from a total of nine candidates. We designed three experiment setups to model different scenarios of person recognition 'attacking' in the context of social media. The three scenarios and corresponding setups are described in Table 3 . The complete set of 24 evaluation images (in both original and protected versions) and all reference images of the 9 individuals (for both within-context and acrosscontext scenarios) are available at http://grebvm2.epfl.ch/lin/ privacy/privacy_dataset.zip. Fig. 8 shows the evaluation images and two sets of reference images of an example target.
User study based on crowdsourcing:
We conducted three subjective experiments on AMT with the above setups, respectively. Every experiment was divided into three sessions, each showing evaluation images with only one type of ROI protected. Every human intelligence task (HIT) of AMT presents six protected evaluation images and an extra image unprotected serving as 'honeypot' to help us remove sloppy subjects. Each image is associated with a question asking subjects to identify the target by selecting one from the nine candidates. The option 'I really don't know' can be selected if subject has no any clue about the protected person. For within-context and across-context setups, the 'honeypot' images were randomly selected from the reference images. For without-context setup, 'honeypot' images were only selected from the three extra identities apart from the six identities under evaluation. In such a way, the unprotected 'honeypot' images do not reveal any information about original evaluation images. For within-context and across-context setups, reference images of all nine candidates are presented in the beginning of each HIT and made always available during the experiment for subjects' review. Fig. 9 shows the screenshot of an image being evaluated in an HIT of AMT. All HITs were published on AMT with the following constraints satisfied:
• Six images evaluated in an HIT belong to six targets, respectively. • The order in which the six targets and applied obfuscations appear is random.
• Each image or HIT is rated by at least seven different subjects.
• Every subject can take unlimited number of HITs within a session but cannot participate in more than one session.
Finally, after filtering out outliers who answered 'honeypot' questions incorrectly, we collected responses from a total of 241 subjects, each rating 39.2 images on average. Fig. 10 shows the average proportion of correct, incorrect, and 'I don't know' answers over all images in the evaluation set, with respect to different recognition scenarios and protection ROIs. First, one observes that the recognition accuracy (proportion of correct answers) of within- No any reference image is provided and subjects need to identify the protected target based on only merely profile head pictures of the nine candidates.
Results and analysis:
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context scenario remains high in most cases: For images with only head or upper-body protected, recognition accuracy against most obfuscations is above 60%; while for full-body protected images, the accuracy is significantly reduced, but still well above the level of random guess. The performances of all the seven obfuscations are comparable, with blur and pixelate showing slightly worse protection to privacy. We admit that in the case where direct context information about the protected person is available, regional visual obfuscation may not provide reliable privacy protection.
In the scenario of across-context recognition, overall recognition accuracies are greatly reduced. In turn, the proportions of incorrect and 'I don't know' answers are significantly raised. The accuracies corresponding to most methods such as JPEG scrambling, P3 and visual masking are lower than 20%. While the accuracies for blur and pixelate protections are obviously higher than the others, because the two methods still disclose certain lowresolution visual information about the original image region.
As for the without-context scenario, recognition accuracies are further reduced: the proportions of correct answers for protection methods including JPEG scrambling, P3 and visual masking are all below 10%. However, the accuracies for blur and pixelate are still higher than 20%. Among all the seven obfuscations, mask and P3.t = 5 provide the strongest protection against recognition, which is reasonable as masking operation completely hides the visual information behind the mask and a strong level of P3 protection is visually similar to a grey mask.
Pleasantness
Methodology:
The second subjective experiment aims at understanding the pleasantness aspect of regional image visual obfuscations. First of all, we give the definition of the term 'pleasantness', which are considered in twofold: (i) Perception Pleasantness (users' perceived feeling when observing a photo obfuscated by a particular method) and (ii) Usage pleasantness
Results and analysis:
For each protected image, we computed its mean opinion score (MOS) of perception pleasantness across ratings from different subjects. The MOSs of all 13 images corresponding to each protection method are shown as boxplot in Fig. 12a . Fig. 12b shows the overall proportions of votes for 'dislike', 'neutral' and 'like' of each protection method. Again, the two Emoji stickers smiley and TearsJoy obtained the most votes for 'like', above 60 and 55%, respectively. Pixelate and blur also received a large number of votes for 'like' (35 and 51%), and at the same time a large number of votes for 'neutral' (both around 30%). This time, the Vendetta mask got a considerable proportion of votes for 'like' and the smallest proportion of votes for 'neutral'. Compared to SnapGhost and C-Stamp, Vendetta received the same number of votes for 'dislike', indicating that the Vendetta mask is prone to being either liked or disliked by people. In addition, the other methods all received much less votes for 'like'. Among all the ten methods, the two distortion-based obfuscations, JPEG scrambling and P3, again received the largest number of votes for 'dislike', indicating the disadvantage of distortion-based obfuscations.
Conclusion
This paper presents secure JPEG transmorphing, a flexible framework for protecting image visual privacy in a secure, reversible and personalised manner. Secure JPEG transmorphing allows one to apply arbitrary regional visual manipulation on image ROIs, while secretly preserving the information about the original ROIs in application segments (APPn markers) of the visually obfuscated JPEG image. The protected image (or transmorphed image) has the same syntax as standard JPEG and is therefore backwards compatible with JPEG. With a dedicated JPEG transcoder or decoder that supports JPEG transmorphing, the original image can be recovered by replacing the obfuscated regions in the protected image with the corresponding original regions extracted from APPn markers. As arbitrary regional image manipulation can be applied, the proposed method provides a significant flexibility and usability such that users can choose their preferred ways to protect any sensitive image regions while still preserving its reversibility. This is the most distinctive characteristic of the proposed method compared to the others. In secure JPEG transmorphing, sensitive information represented in the sub-image is encrypted before being inserted. Therefore, the security of the proposed solution mostly relies on the encryption scheme applied. The security analysis is out of the scope of this paper.
With secure JPEG transmorphing, images of near lossless quality (compared to original image) can be reconstructed from protected image even if the latter has been manipulated by lossy transformations, e.g. scaling, cropping and compression. Inserting additional transmorphing data in JPEG image causes overhead to image file size but such overhead can be modulated by the proposed overhead control mechanism without affecting the reconstruction quality. Both facts are verified in our objective experiments.
Regional image obfuscations may not offer the perfect protection to privacy in certain scenarios as unprotected regions in image may still reveal private information, it is reliable enough in cases where unprotected image regions do not disclose straightforward context information about the protected target that matches other public information of that target. This is proven in a subjective experiment carried out via online crowdsourcing.
Last but not the least, we conducted another subjective experiment using crowdsourcing to investigate the pleasantness of different image obfuscations. Results indicate that distortion-based visual protections (e.g. JPEG scrambling and P3) may not provide the optimal pleasantness from both perception and usage perspectives. Instead, more intuitive, personalised and still reversible visual protection can be achieved using the proposed secure JPEG transmorphing.
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